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Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit's Unequal
Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming
Standards Under Title VII
In July 2000, Darlene Jespersen faced a difficult choice. She
could either comply with Harrah's Casino's ("Harrah's") requirement
that all of its female beverage servers wear makeup, or she could risk
losing her job.' Jespersen chose to violate her employer's
requirement rather than bear the feelings of degradation that she felt
accompanied wearing makeup.2 Ultimately, Harrah's terminated
Jespersen for her decision to violate the grooming policy by not
wearing makeup.3 Jespersen challenged her termination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful for
employers to discriminate on the basis of sex.' Courts have said that
Title VII is "intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."5 Yet,
this promise has not yet been realized when it comes to grooming
standards. Thus far, courts have been unable to find a workable
method for evaluating the harmful discrimination that often arises
when employers utilize sex-differentiated grooming standards.6
In Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co.,' a three-judge panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit evaluated
Harrah's grooming standard under the unequal burdens test, an
approach which weighs the burdens imposed by a grooming standard
1. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), affd en
banc, No. 03-15045, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006). After rehearing
Jespersen en banc, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the three-judge panel's decision on April 14,
2006. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., No. 03-15045, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307, at
*5 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006). The facts cited in this Recent Development refer to the three-
judge panel's decision and are substantially the same as those included in the en banc
decision. See id. at *5-9.
2. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1078 ("[Jespersen] found that wearing makeup made her
feel sick, degraded, exposed and violated.").
3. Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
5. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (describing
the interpretation of Title VII).
6. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2556-59
(1994) (evaluating the various approaches adopted by courts when applying Title VII).
7. Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076.
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on one gender relative to the other.8 The three-judge panel affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, Harrah's.9
The Ninth Circuit reheard Jespersen en banc on June 22, 2005
and affirmed the three-judge panel's decision on April 14, 2006.10 In
the en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the unequal
burdens approach to evaluating grooming standards. The Ninth
Circuit went on to hold that appearance standards may be the subject
of a Title VII claim for sex stereotyping but that Jespersen failed to
raise an issue of triable fact under such a claim.1 The en banc court
took the opposite position from the three-judge panel, which had
refused to extend the law regarding sex stereotyping to grooming
cases.12
This Recent Development argues that the unequal burdens test,
as applied by the three-judge panel in Jespersen,3 is flawed in two
critical ways and, therefore, does not protect employees from harmful
sex discrimination. First, the test allows courts to balance away
harmful discrimination by pointing to a corresponding burden on the
other gender. Second, the unequal burdens test fails to consider the
presence of harmful sex stereotypes, the real burden created by
grooming standards. After discussing these flaws, this Recent
Development argues that the en banc Ninth Circuit was correct in
holding that a plaintiff could state a Title VII claim for sex
stereotyping in a grooming standard case, but that the court should
have done more to clarify the claim and to give it force. In
conclusion, this Recent Development proposes a more stringent sex
stereotyping evaluation and offers two guiding criteria for courts
applying the test.
8. Id. at 1081.
9. Id. at 1083.
10. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., No. 03-15045, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307
(9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006).
11. Id. at *5.
12. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1083.
13. This Recent Development focuses on the unequal burdens analysis of the three-
judge panel rather than on the en banc Ninth Circuit's analysis. The en banc court
reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit's approach to unequal burdens but granted summary
judgment against Jespersen on an evidentiary issue, rather than performing a full analysis.
See Jespersen, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307, at *16-17 (holding that the time and cost of
makeup is not within the category of facts of which courts take judicial notice).
Meanwhile, the three-judge panel performed a more in-depth evaluation of the facts
under the unequal burdens test. See Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1080-82 (applying the unequal
burdens test).
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At issue in Jespersen was Harrah's grooming policy, which
required female employees to wear face powder or concealer, blush,
mascara, and lip color at all times. 4 The policy for male employees
merely required that males not wear makeup, that hair be cut above
the collar, and that fingernails be clean and trimmed.15 Jespersen
chose not to wear makeup, in violation of Harrah's mandatory policy,
because the makeup policy "made her feel extremely uncomfortable
and 'degraded' that she had to 'cover [her] face and become pretty or
feminine' in order to keep her job."' 6 Jespersen, who had worked for
Harrah's Casino in Reno, Nevada, for twenty years as a bartender,
was fired from her job for her choice not to comply with the
company's makeup policy. 7
In order to understand the Jespersen unequal burdens analysis, a
discussion of the trends in evaluating grooming standards is useful.
Initially, courts held that sex-specific grooming standards did not
violate Title VII because they did not involve "immutable"
characteristics but instead covered traits that could be "readily
changed."' 8  Next, courts established the slightly broader unequal
burdens test. The unequal burdens test finds Title VII violations
when an employer's grooming standard regulates mutable
characteristics of one gender in a stricter way than those of the other
gender. 9 The Ninth Circuit defined the test for these types of
violations in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,2 holding that "a sex
differentiated appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on
men and women is disparate treatment."'" The unequal burden in
Frank stemmed from a grooming standard that imposed stricter
weight requirements on female flight attendants relative to their male
14. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1078 n.2. For a more complete discussion of Harrah's
makeup policy, see infra note 33.
15. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1078 n.2.
16. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief at 3, Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076 (No. 03-
15045).
17. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1078. Prior to her termination, Jespersen consistently
received praise from supervisors and customers for her excellent service. Id. at 1077.
18. Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding
that hair length requirements for men did not constitute unlawful sex discrimination under
Title VII); see also Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.
1975) (holding that hair length standards did not touch upon an immutable characteristic
or a protected right).
19. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1982).
20. 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
21. Id. at 855.
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counterparts.2 2 The Frank court held that the plaintiffs were entitled
to summary judgment, not simply because the requirement for female
employees was different from the requirement for male employees,
but because the sex-differentiated standard was more burdensome on
the female flight attendants.23
A majority of the three-judge panel in Jespersen adopted the
Frank unequal burdens approach to determine whether Harrah's
grooming standards violated Title VII.24  The court evaluated the
relative burdens of Harrah's policy by assessing "the actual impact
that it ha[d] on both male and female employees. '25 In applying the
unequal burdens test, the court compared the cost and time burdens
necessary for male and female employees to comply with the
grooming policy.26
Two important flaws, however, render this approach ineffective
at adequately protecting employees from harmful sex discrimination.
First, the unequal burdens approach allows harmful discrimination
caused by sex-differentiated grooming standards to persist as long as
the discriminatory burden is balanced against a corresponding burden
on the other gender. Second, the unequal burdens test is artificial
because it fails to address the persistence of sex stereotypes, the real
burden created by grooming standards.
Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.27 illustrates the first flaw in the unequal
burdens approach. In Craft, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant, a local news station, did
not discriminate against a female news anchor when its management
criticized her appearance, imposed a "clothing calendar" on her, and
forced her to meet with an image consultant.28 The plaintiff was
reassigned after failing to conform to the viewing audience's image of
22. Id. at 854 (explaining that the airline's policy required female flight attendants to
maintain a body weight that corresponded to a relatively smaller frame category than male
flight attendants).
23. Id. at 854-55. Title VII provides a defense for intentional gender discrimination if
the characteristic is found to be "a bona fide occupational qualification" ("BFOQ"). 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). The BFOQ defense, however, did not apply in Jespersen,
see 392 F.3d 1076, 1079 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004), affd en banc, No. 03-15045, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9307 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006), and it is only available in very limited circumstances,
see, e.g., Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) ("The BFOQ defense is
written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly.").
24. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1081.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
28. Id. at 1208-09.
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an anchorwoman and ultimately left the station.29  The court's
decision in Craft highlighted that the news station was concerned with
the appearance of both male and female news anchors." Because the
Craft court was able to point to a grooming standard for men, in
addition to the one so rigorously applied to the female plaintiff, it
found that there was no Title VII violation.3
Two members of the three-judge panel in Jespersen adopted an
approach similar to Craft, defining the unequal burdens test as
"weighing the relative burdens that particular requirements impose
on workers of one sex against the distinct requirements imposed on
workers of the other sex. '32 The majority's application of the unequal
burdens test, however, did not compare the makeup policy for women
to the corresponding no-makeup policy for men.33 Instead, the court
evaluated the makeup policy for female employees against the entire
grooming policy for male employees.34 Approaching the issue in this
way, the court held that Jespersen failed to produce evidence that the
grooming standard imposed unequal burdens on female employees
relative to their male counterparts.35
The Jespersen court's approach of comparing the makeup policy
for female employees against the entire grooming policy for male
employees exemplifies the first flaw of the unequal burdens test-that
the test allows harmful discrimination to persist by balancing away
the discriminatory burden. A strict adherence to the unequal burdens
approach allows the most offensive sex discrimination to go
unchecked so long as employees of the other gender are subjected to
29. Id. at 1209.
30. Id. at 1217 (accepting the district court's findings with regard to the relative
policies for male and female news personnel).
31. Id. at 1209-10, 1217; see Bartlett, supra note 6, at 2563-65 (arguing that Craft
exemplifies the difficulty of demonstrating that a female's appearance has been judged
more stringently than a male's appearance).
32. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004), affid en
banc, No. 03-15045, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006).
33. Id. The makeup policy to which Jespersen objected required that " 'makeup
(foundation/concealer and/or face powder, as well as blush and mascara) must be worn
and applied neatly in complimentary colors' and that 'lip color must be worn at all
times.' " Id. at 1078 n.2. Women were also required to keep their hair "teased, curled, or
styled." Id. at 1078 n.1. Meanwhile, male employees were only required to keep their hair
above their shirt collar and to keep their hands clean and fingernails trimmed. Id.
34. The majority defined its task as weighing "the cost and time necessary for
employees of each sex to comply with the policy." Id. at 1081. In so doing, the majority
rejected the better approach proposed by Jespersen of measuring the makeup policy for
female employees against the no-makeup policy for male employees. Id. If the court had
adopted this more reasonable approach, then Harrah's grooming policy may have failed
the unequal burdens test, in spite of the test's inherent flaws.
35. Id. at 1081.
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comparable time and cost burdens. For example, a grooming
standard requiring women to wear sexually revealing outfits, while
requiring men to wear business casual attire clearly constitutes
harmful discrimination. Under a strict application of the unequal
burdens test, however, the policy would not violate Title VII because
it does not impose a greater time or cost burden on one gender
relative to the other.
As the dissent from the three-judge panel pointed out, by the
majority's logic "a sex-differentiated appearance requirement that
burdens women ... could be permissible if the employer unfairly
burdened men via another sex-differentiated appearance
requirement. '36 By this logic, both men and women may be subject to
grooming policies that are offensive and based on harmful sex
stereotypes but would find no recourse under the unequal burdens
test because the grooming policies would impact both genders
equally.37 Accordingly, the unequal burdens test leaves employees
unprotected because courts can simply point to burdens imposed on
the other sex to balance away harmful discrimination.38
The second major flaw in the unequal burdens test is that it fails
to consider the harmful effects of sex stereotyping as one of the
burdens faced by plaintiffs.39 In assessing the unequal burdens on
male and female employers, the majority of the three-judge panel
only considered evidence of tangible burdens, such as the time and
monetary cost associated with the makeup policy for females relative
to the grooming policy for males.4' While this approach of weighing
the tangible burdens of a grooming standard may have been suitable
in Frank, where female flight attendants took extreme measures to
lose weight to comply with the policy, 41 it was ill-suited to address the
harmful discrimination faced by the plaintiff in Jespersen. Although
Jespersen presented evidence at trial regarding the cost and time
36. Id. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52 (arguing that grooming standards based
on harmful sex stereotypes perpetuate harmful societal preconceptions and should be
invalidated under Title VII).
38. See Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (offering the example that
a more stringent weight limit for women may be permissible if there is an equivalent
burden on men).
39. See id. at 1082-83 (majority opinion) (explaining the rationale for rejecting sex
stereotyping as a basis for invalidating a grooming standard under Title VII).
40. See id. at 1081.
41. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[P]laintiffs
attempted to lose weight by various means, including severely restricting their caloric
intake, using diuretics, and purging."); see also infra note 63.
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burden of the makeup policy,42 the real burden imposed by the
requirement was that it "made her feel sick, degraded, exposed, and
'forced her to be feminine.' 4 3
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,44 the United States Supreme
Court explained that "we are beyond the day when an employer
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group. '45 The plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse was not promoted to partner partially because she was
perceived as too "macho" by evaluating partners.46 The partners told
the plaintiff that her chances for promotion would improve if she
acted in a more feminine manner, including wearing makeup and
jewelry. 47 The Court held that it was unlawful for employers to
evaluate employees by insisting that they conform to stereotypes
associated with their gender.48
The three-judge panel in Jespersen, however, rejected the
plaintiff's claim that Price Waterhouse provided an independent basis
for invalidating the defendant's grooming standard regarding
women.49 In so holding, the court foreclosed the possibility of sex
stereotyping entering into their evaluation of grooming standards and
ignored the plaintiff's most compelling argument for discrimination in
violation of Title VII.
Grooming standards that force compliance with gender
stereotypes often perpetuate harmful societal preconceptions that
place one gender, typically women, in a lower position.50 As the
dissent in Jespersen argued, the sex-differentiated grooming standards
42. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1081.
43. Id. at 1077.
44. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
45. Id. at 251.
46. Id. at 235.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 251.
49. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2004), aff'd
en banc, No. 03-15045, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006) (holding that
Price Waterhouse should not be extended to apply to grooming cases). Some courts have,
however, extended the holding in Price Waterhouse to sexual harassment cases. See Smith
v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a transsexual faced
discrimination when he was criticized for failing to conform to sex stereotypes); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a waiter who was
harassed for failing to conform to sex stereotypes stated a valid claim under Title VII).
50. See Bartlett, supra note 6, at 2556-59. See generally Robert Post, Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29
(2000) (arguing that grooming standards that conform to community standards are
generally held not to be discriminatory, while those that do not conform to such standards
are more likely to be found discriminatory).
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promulgated by Harrah's denigrated women by forcing them to
conform to sex stereotypes unrelated to their ability to perform job-.
related tasks.51 All too often, courts assume that the costs on
employees of grooming standards are "nominal" or "non-existent."52
By weighing only time and cost burdens, courts ignore the feelings of
degradation that accompany grooming standards based on harmful
prejudices and stereotypes.
Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n53 illustrates the
problems that arise when a company bases its grooming standards on
harmful sex stereotypes. In Carroll, the employer required female
employees to wear a five-item uniform, while male employees were
required only to wear customary business attire. 4 The employer in
Carroll justified the distinction by arguing that women were more
likely to engage in "dress competition" with other women and that
"women who have excellent business judgment somehow follow the
fashion" and "don't seem to equate [choices of attire] with a matter of
business judgment."55 The Ninth Circuit observed that the proffered
justifications indicated that the grooming standard was based on
harmful sex stereotypes and held that the standard violated Title
VII.5 6
In Jespersen, the defendant's grooming standard, requiring
female employees to wear makeup, forced compliance with the
stereotype that women should adorn their faces to be more attractive
and to appear more feminine. The requirement, however, went
beyond merely mandating good grooming habits, as required by the
grooming standard for men. Instead, the policy forced women to
51. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1086 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting
Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 237-38 (C.D. Cal. 1972)).
53. 604 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 1029. One could argue that the unequal burdens test would invalidate the
grooming standard in Carroll because women were forced to bear a greater cost than men
to comply with the sex-differentiated standard. See id. at 1030 (explaining that the cost of
the uniform is treated as income to female employees for tax purposes and detailing the
time burdens associated with cleaning and maintaining the uniform). The time and cost
associated with the standard, however, were not the real burdens felt by female
employees. The real discrimination was the message conveyed by the paternalistic
policy-that women cannot be trusted to dress themselves in appropriate business attire-
and the perpetuation of a harmful stereotype regarding women. See supra notes 50-52
and accompanying text.
55. Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033.
56. Id.
57. See generally CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK:
WOMEN AND MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 63 (1989) (explaining that
women marine recruits are required to wear makeup to preserve a sense of femininity).
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project an image of femininity that many, like Jespersen, would find
offensive and degrading.58 Under the unequal burdens test, harmful
sex stereotypes go unchecked and continue to adversely impact
employees because the test does not consider whether the grooming
policy perpetuates such harmful stereotypes.
The en banc Ninth Circuit was correct to reverse the three-judge
panel's holding that a plaintiff could not state a valid Title VII claim
for sex stereotyping in a grooming standards case.59 By extending
Price Waterhouse to apply to sex stereotyping in grooming cases,60 the
en banc Ninth Circuit mitigated some of the shortcomings of the
unequal burdens approach. The en banc court, however, did not offer
sufficient guidance for plaintiffs stating a claim of sex stereotyping
under Title VII. Instead, the Ninth Circuit merely distinguished
Jespersen from the facts of Price Waterhouse and stated that "[i]f a
grooming standard ... amounts to impermissible stereotyping,
something [the record of Jespersen] does not establish, a plaintiff...
may challenge that requirement under Price Waterhouse."'" The en
banc court adopted the correct rule but failed to provide sufficient
guidance to give the rule any meaningful force.
This Recent Development proposes a more complete approach
to evaluating grooming standards under Title VII. Applying Price
Waterhouse, courts should examine grooming policies to determine
whether those standards perpetuate outmoded, archaic sex
stereotypes that serve to disadvantage or stigmatize one gender.62
This proposed more stringent examination should precede any
evaluation of relative cost or time burdens. In effect, courts would
58. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada et al. in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th
Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL 24133171, at *7-11 [hereinafter ACLU Brief]
(discussing the historical significance of wearing makeup as an explanation for why many
women perceive makeup requirements as "offensive and disempowering"); Bartlett, supra
note 6, at 2547 (asserting that, while male grooming standards emphasize strength and
competence, requirements for women force them to strike a balance between being too
much like a woman and not being enough like one).
59. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., No. 03-15045, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
9307, at *5 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006) ("[Wle hold that appearance standards, including
makeup requirements, may well be the subject of a Title VII claim for sexual stereotyping
60. See id. at *18-22 (discussing the application of Price Waterhouse to the facts of
Jespersen).
61. Id. at *21-22.
62. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[Tlhe primary
thrust of Title VII ... is to prompt employers to 'discard outmoded sex stereotypes posing
distinct employment disadvantages for one sex.' " (quoting Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527
F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975))); Bartlett, supra note 6, at 2569.
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utilize a two-prong test in which they first would evaluate grooming
standards to determine whether they perpetuate harmful stereotypes
and second would perform the traditional unequal burdens test,
weighing the costs and burdens imposed by the sex-differentiated
grooming standards.63 Failure to satisfy either prong of the test would
constitute a violation of Title VII.
Furthermore, this Recent Development offers two guiding
criteria to reduce potential inconsistency and narrow the focus of the
evaluation for sex stereotyping in grooming standard cases. First,
when community standards are used to justify a sex-differentiated
grooming requirement, courts should look to the root or historical
basis of the community standard. If this investigation reveals that the
requirement is based on a sex stereotype that is offensive or
demeaning, the court should invalidate the standard under Title VII.64
Second, courts should evaluate the degree to which the sex-
differentiated grooming standard impairs the employee's ability to
complete job-related tasks. 65 These two guiding criteria will hone the
proposed more stringent sex stereotype evaluation to weed out
grooming standards based on harmful sex stereotypes, while leaving
benign sex-differentiated grooming standards untouched. Now that
63. This Recent Development does not argue that the proposed approach should
entirely supplant the unequal burdens test because the test is useful in the situation where
the tangible burdens of a grooming standard are more onerous for one gender relative to
the other, similar to the example of the flight attendants from Frank v. United Airlines, 216
F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2000). See supra notes 22, 41 and accompanying text.
64. See ACLU Brief, supra note 58, at *6-11 (proposing that norms should be
evaluated for their cultural meanings). There are several social science authorities
available that discuss the historical basis of the community standard that women should
wear makeup. See KATHY PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR: THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S BEAUTY
CULTURE 7-8 (1998) (presenting a balanced comparison of beauty as a commercial myth);
NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST
WOMEN 12-14 (1991) (describing the "beauty myth" as being about "politics, finance, and
sexual repression"). These types of sources would be useful to courts in performing the
proposed investigation into whether a grooming requirement is based on harmful sex
stereotypes. See ACLU Brief, supra note 58, at *7-11, for an example of how these
authorities may be useful to understanding the historical basis of a grooming requirement.
There will certainly be cases, however, where this type of social science authority is
unavailable. In those cases, and even in cases where there are such sources, courts will be
forced to make subjective determinations. While these determinations may be criticized
as unjustifiably subjective, they are the very type of judgments that courts are called upon
to make all the time.
65. See generally Marc Linder, Smart Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers:
The Unlawfulness and Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatory
Workplace Footwear Requirements for Female Employees, 22 J. CORP. L. 295 (1997)
(arguing that requiring female flight attendants to wear high heels poses a significant
health risk and may constitute sex discrimination under Title VII).
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the Ninth Circuit recognizes a claim for sex stereotyping, it should
adopt these guiding criteria to give the claim meaning and force.
A comparison of two common appearance standards illustrates
the usefulness of the first criteria. Employers often require male
employees to wear ties and business suits. This attire was
traditionally worn to convey confidence and command respect.66 As
such, a requirement mandating that men wear ties and suits-while
clearly based on a sex-specific stereotype--does not demean or
stigmatize the gender but instead is a relatively benign requirement.67
On the other hand, an appearance standard requiring women to wear
skirts may be based on stereotypes that women should be relegated to
a more passive role in business or, worse, that women should have a
certain sexual appeal.68 Accordingly, courts should view the skirt
requirement, where the underlying basis for the distinction may
demean one gender, more skeptically than those, like the tie
requirement, that do not have such harmful roots.69
Moving to the second guiding criteria, the en banc Ninth Circuit
in Jespersen held that Jespersen was not a case where the grooming
standard tended to stereotype women as sex objects.7 ° In support of
that holding, the en banc court distinguished Jespersen from Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sage Realty Corp. 71 a case
that invalidated a grooming standard because it impeded the
plaintiff's ability to do her job.72 In Sage Realty, the plaintiff, a lobby
attendant, was required to wear a uniform that was too revealing and
66. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 2547 ("Throughout European history, men's clothing has
emphasized strength and competence .... ).
67. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that requiring employees to wear ties is not discrimination under Title VII).
68. See Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 1395, 1419 (1992) ("[E]mployer bans on wearing pants to work are based
almost entirely on sex stereotypes: that women are less capable than men, that they are
better suited for less active or assertive roles, that women must do more to appear serious
and business-like .... ").
69. In an amicus brief filed in support of Jespersen, the ACLU and others argued that
[c]onventions about male appearance and grooming, e.g., that men should have
short hair, and not wear makeup or jewelry, serve to reinforce stereotypes of men
as functional, efficient and competent, rather than ornamental. In contrast,
conventions about female appearance and grooming-for example, that women
should wear makeup and style their hair carefully-serve to reinforce stereotypes
of women as decorative and ornamental.
ACLU Brief, supra note 58, at *27.
70. Id. at *22.
71. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
72. Id. at 605.
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consequently impaired her ability to perform her job by subjecting
her to harassment.73 The uniform the plaintiff's employer required
her to wear was too short and left her thighs and buttocks exposed.74
The court in Sage Realty held that the defendant's uniform
requirement constituted unlawful discrimination under Title VII.75
In Jespersen, the en banc Ninth Circuit compared Harrah's
uniform requirement to the uniform required in Sage Realty and held
that Harrah's "Personal Best" policy does not "indicate any
discriminatory or sexually stereotypical intent on the part of
Harrah's."76  Sage Realty, however, should serve as an extreme
example of when courts should be on notice for unlawful
discrimination due to a grooming standard that makes it difficult for
any employee to perform her job.77 Surely a plaintiff does not have to
show that a grooming standard left her exposed to the public before
stating a claim for sex stereotyping under Title VII. The en banc
Ninth Circuit was right to evaluate the degree to which a grooming
standard prevented the plaintiff from performing job related tasks,
but the court should have performed a more probing analysis of the
grooming requirement rather than simply comparing the policy to the
egregious conduct of the employer in Sage Realty.
There are several potential criticisms of the proposed more
stringent sex stereotype evaluation. First, critics may argue that the
proposed test is not useful because it requires courts to make a
subjective determination as to what constitutes a harmful sex
stereotype.78 As a result, courts may reach inconsistent results in
determining the meaning of harmful sex stereotype under Title VII.
Courts, however, make subjective evaluations all the time. Applying
the proposed guiding criteria will help narrow the courts' focus and
reduce subjectivity. The en banc Ninth Circuit predicts that as the
73. Id.
74. Id. at 604.
75. Id. at 611.
76. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., No. 03-15045, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307,
at *23 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006). The court's analysis is meaningless because it compares
Harrah's requirement that beverage servers wear a unisex uniform to Sage Realty rather
than analyzing the makeup requirement, which is the focus of Jespersen's claim. See id.
77. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("An employer who
objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in
an intolerable and impermissible catch 22. ); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d
845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (arguing that weight requirements impair emergency response).
78. See generally Bartlett, supra note 6, at 2556-65 (evaluating the various approaches
courts have taken to challenges of grooming standards).
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law on sex stereotyping in grooming cases progresses, claims will be
refined and standards will be come clearer over time.79
Second, critics may contend that extending the precedent of
Price Waterhouse to cases concerning grooming standards would
result in an overly broad prohibition on the use of any sex stereotype
in the formation of appearance standards.8" Presumably, all sex-
differentiated grooming standards are based on some form of sex
stereotype or community standard. Consequently, a blanket rule
against the use of such stereotypes would eliminate requirements
based on harmful stereotypes, as well as those based on community
standards that may be useful and not harmful at all.8 The proposed
evaluation, however, does not offer a blanket prohibition. Rather,
applying the proposed guiding criteria, courts would focus more
narrowly on harmful discrimination while leaving more benign
grooming standards untouched.
Finally, another criticism of the proposed test, which is not
directly addressed by the guiding criteria, is that the test unjustly
impairs an employer's ability to run her own business and to control
the company's public image.82 In the past, courts have highlighted
this consideration, recognizing that "perhaps no facet of business life
is more important than a company's place in public estimation."83
These courts have held that grooming standards fall within a
business's important ability to control the image it projects to the
community. 84  In Jespersen, Harrah's argued that the makeup
requirement, as part of its Personal Best program, was intended to
79. See Jespersen, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307, at *25 (predicting that as claims of sex
stereotyping in grooming cases are considered over time the bases for such claims will be
"refined as the law in the area evolves").
80. See Appellee's Answering Brief at 36-38, Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2005)
(No. 03-15045) (contending that the argument for extending Price Waterhouse amounts to
an attempt to create an asexual workplace by using Title VII to eradicate all sex
stereotypes and is, therefore, against public policy).
81. E.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1975)
(stating that a short haircut requirement came in response to a pop festival in the area that
soured the attitude of customers toward "long-haired males"); Fagan v. Nat'l Cash
Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that a prohibition on long hair
came in direct response to customer complaints regarding careless grooming).
82. See Brief of the Equal Employment Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae on
Rehearing En Banc in Support of Defendant-Appellee and in Support of Affirmance,
Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2005
WL 1501597, at *8 ("Projecting a positive, professional image is of vital importance to
most employers, particularly in today's highly competitive business environments.");
Bartlett, supra note 6, at 2553-54 (discussing the employer's potential "appearance
interest" in its employees).
83. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124-25.
84. Id.
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create a "brand standard of excellence" throughout its casinos.85
Applying the reasoning of previous court decisions, it would follow
that Harrah's should receive a degree of deference in crafting its
grooming standards and in "running its own shop." 6
As a matter of policy, however, sex-differentiated grooming
standards should not be entitled to such deference when they
perpetuate harmful sex stereotypes. Rather, courts must intervene
when businesses base grooming standards on community expectations
that are archaic or outmoded.87 If courts continue to give businesses
deference to conform to community expectations that perpetuate
harmful sex stereotypes, then these stereotypes will persist, and the
private biases of the community will be allowed to dictate the
outcome in discrimination cases.88  The proposed first prong
evaluation attempts to distinguish between grooming standards based
on benign community standards and those that are based on harmful
stereotypes. Given the risk of perpetuating damaging societal
preconceptions, if a court finds that a grooming standard is founded
on a harmful stereotype or inhibits an employee's job performance, it
should not defer to the employer's argument that such policies are in
place simply to meet community expectations.
In order to illustrate the practical application of the more
stringent sex stereotyping evaluation, it is useful to explore the facts
of Jespersen under the proposed test. The first step, applying the first
of two proposed guiding criteria, would be to determine whether
Harrah's makeup policy was founded on a sex stereotype and to
explore the historical origin or basis of that stereotype.89 Under the
first criteria, in arguing that the policy is not grounded on a harmful
stereotype, Harrah's may contend that the makeup requirement is
simply meant to reflect or enhance the natural beauty of female
85. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077-78. Trade groups argued that Harrah's has a greater
interest in requiring employees to wear makeup, given the nature of customer
expectations in the casino industry and in a city like Reno, Nevada. See Brief of Amici
Curiae Council for Employment Law Equity et al. in Support of Defendant-Appellee,
Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076 (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL 22340442, at *10.
86. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092.
87. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (arguing that sex stereotypes are
perpetuated if they are allowed to persist in the form of grooming standards).
88. Harmful stereotypes are perpetuated when casino owners require female
bartenders to wear makeup because patrons expect them to be "dolled up" when they
come to drink. See Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077 (explaining that the plaintiff felt that
wearing makeup " 'forced her to be feminine' and to become 'dolled up' like a sexual
object").
89. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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employees.90 Makeup requirements, however, are typically grounded
on a stereotype that women should be ornamental and feminine in
appearance, a community expectation that is archaic and offensive to
many.91 Judge Pregerson's analysis, in dissent, further illustrates the
application of the first criteria. Judge Pregerson argued that Harrah's
makeup policy was based on a "cultural assumption ... that women's
faces are incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional without full
makeup. '
Moving to the second criteria, one must next determine whether
the makeup policy hinders female bartenders in the performance of
job-related tasks.93 Jespersen argued that her ability to handle unruly
patrons was compromised by the makeup requirement.94 According
to Jespersen, the presence of makeup "took away her credibility"
with the customers.95 One could imagine a scenario, similar to the
one in Sage Realty, where a female bartender was subjected to
harassment from male customers because a makeup requirement
required her to look ornamental or sexually appealing.96 Accordingly,
the impairment of an employee's ability to perform job-related tasks
should raise the court's awareness to the potential presence of
unlawful discrimination.
If the Ninth Circuit had considered Jespersen under the proposed
sex stereotyping evaluation, it should have found that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant.
Applying the proposed test, Jespersen, as demonstrated above, met
90. Harrah's potential argument is somewhat unpersuasive because the policy is
highly specific as to what it requires of female employees. See supra note 33.
91. See ACLU Brief, supra note 58, at *11 ("[B]eing forced to wear makeup at work
has a long-standing social and historical significance that is specifically sex-linked and is
deeply offensive and disempowering to many women.").
92. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., No. 03-150145, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307,
at *36 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski referred to the
concept that women should wear makeup as a "cultural artifact." Id. at * 40 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
93. See supra notes 65, 70-77 and accompanying text.
94. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077.
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
97. While the approach proposed by this Recent Development retains the unequal
burdens evaluation, the facts of Jespersen are not reevaluated here under the second prong
of the test. As explained above, the unequal burdens approach is retained for the narrow
situation where the tangible burdens of a grooming policy are more onerous for one
gender relative to the other. See supra note 63. In dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that
Jespersen raised a triable issue of fact under the unequal burdens test. See Jespersen, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 9307, at *37 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (contending that the court should
take judicial notice of the time and cost burdens associated with the makeup requirement).
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her burden of proof by raising an issue of material fact for trial.98 In
dissent, Judge Pregerson argued that Harrah's grooming policy was
motivated by sex stereotyping and, therefore, violated Title VII.99 As
the law of sex stereotyping in grooming cases progresses, the Ninth
Circuit should adopt an approach similar to the one proposed in this
Recent Development so that plaintiffs have access to a meaningful
claim in the area.
In order to fully realize the promise of Title VII, courts must
adopt a more effective approach to evaluating sex-differentiated
grooming standards. The Jespersen unequal burdens approach is
rendered ineffective when courts balance out potentially harmful
discrimination by pointing to corresponding burdens imposed on the
other gender. Furthermore, the unequal burdens test, as applied by
the three-judge panel in Jespersen, fails to consider sex stereotyping,
which is the most common form of harmful discrimination present in
grooming standard cases.
A better approach would be to perform a meaningful evaluation
of the degree to which requirements perpetuate harmful sex
stereotypes. Such an evaluation should look for both for the
historical root underlying the sex-differentiated standard and also any
impairment of the employee's ability to perform job-related tasks.
Courts must reform their approach so that employees like Darlene
Jespersen are not forced to decide between sacrificing their career or
conforming to stereotypes that they feel are harmful to themselves
and their gender.
WILLIAM M. MILLER
98. See Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1079 (explaining the burden of proof for surviving a
motion for summary judgment as raising a genuine issue of material fact).
99. Jespersen, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9307, at *27 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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